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• The use of referendums in processes of constitutional formation and change has 
increased considerably across the world in recent decades.
• This proliferation means that referendums have occurred in some of the most fragile 
and conflict-affected states, where there are many issues surrounding democracy and 
stability.
• This Discussion Paper identifies four main areas of constitutional practice that attract 
referendums.
• The use of the referendum has come to be seen as both highly significant and 
potentially problematic, particularly in territories beset by conflict or inter-ethnic 
division.
• The paper discusses three main issues that highlight the difficulties that referendums 




new states or new constitutions (or both).
• The concept of sovereignty becomes more complex when we tie it to legitimacy. 
When we see popular endorsement emerge as the source of the constitution’s 
legitimacy, it is clear that sovereignty is tied inextricably to popular consent. So, when 
people vote in a referendum on the founding of a new constitution, these people are 
in a sense the ‘constituent subjects’ of the constitution.
• A constitutive referendum can help to overcome the ‘demos problem’, replacing an 
abstract problem with a real solution. The issue in play here is that of identity, and 
how a constitutive referendum can play a role in helping to frame the civic identity of 
the polity.
• But we are left with two considerable difficulties: defining ‘the people’ and the 
amenability of the constitutive referendum to accommodate societal pluralism.
• These are issues that need to be confronted if the referendum is to be a viable device 
in constitution-building within complex and divided societies.
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• What is needed is a full articulation of what a referendum does and the crucial role it 
can play in legitimizing a constitution, underpinning its sovereignty and helping to 
frame constitutional identity. It is also crucial to understand that a referendum posits 
the idea of ‘the people’ speaking and determining; if the idea of ‘the people’ is deeply 





The use of referendums in processes of constitutional formation and change has increased 
considerably across the world in recent decades. This Discussion Paper lays out the main 
areas of constitutional practice where referendums have increasingly been used. It then 
considers the problems that this development poses in terms of how we determine the 
constitutional status of referendums and how their use has an impact upon our 
understanding of constitutional sovereignty and the very identity of the constitutional 
people.
A main point of focus for the paper is how the proliferation of referendums has extended 
to the process of constitution-making itself, involving some of the most complex and fraught 





The referendum has become a fixed feature of state- and constitution-building across the 
globe. Table 1 gives a breakdown of how referendum use has increased in four main areas of 
constitutional practice since the end of the Cold War.
First, in the founding of new states, the referendum was widely used in the early 1990s, in 
the respective break-ups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and it is now the default 
mechanism for the emergence of most new states, as exemplified by Eritrea (1993), Timor- 
Leste (1999), Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). Notably, referendums were held 
on independence in Scotland in September 2014 and, with disputed legality, in Catalonia 
and Kurdistan (Iraq) in 2017.
Table 1. Four types of referendum after the end of the Cold War
Type of referendum Examples
Founding of new states Ukraine (1991), Slovenia (1990), Croatia (1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Eritrea 
(1993), Timor-Leste (1999), Montenegro (2006), South Sudan (2011)  
 
Scotland 2014 (a ‘No’ vote) Catalonia 2017 (a ‘Yes’ vote, but with disputed legality)
Creation and amendment of new 
constitutions
New states emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia  
 
Iraq: ratification of the Constitution of 2005  
 
Egypt: referendums to adopt new constitutions in 2013 and 2014
Substate autonomy Spain referendums: e.g. Basque Country (1979), Catalonia (1979), Galicia (1980)  
 
United Kingdom referendums: Scotland (1997), Wales (1997 and 2011), Northern Ireland 
(1998)
European Union: treaty-making 
processes in respect of accession, 
dissent or exit
Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia  








cases’, Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2 (2016), pp. 99–118.
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Second, when creating or amending constitutions at some point in time referendums were 
very rarely used (Tierney 2014); however, throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and more 
recently in Egypt, Iraq and Kenya (new constitutions), and Bolivia, Ireland and Rwanda 
(constitutional amendments), the referendum has emerged as an instrument both in the 
founding of new constitutions and as part of future amendment procedures within the text of 
these constitutions.
Third, although the referendum is a device deployed by nationalists in attempts to secede 
from states, it has also been central to the establishing of complex new models of substate 
autonomy (as we have seen in Spain and the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and 1990s 
respectively), and in ongoing processes of constitutional change (e.g. a referendum on further 
devolution for Wales in 2011). A related example is the referendum in Canada on the draft 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992, where distinct referendum processes were held respectively in 
Quebec and the rest of Canada (Tierney 2016). There is, then, a complex interplay between 
referendums used to create or extend autonomy to substate territories, and referendums on 
secession: the failure of the Charlottetown process sparked the process leading to the Quebec 
independence referendum in 1995.
The fourth and final example is various referendums in the EU context. While there has 
been sporadic use of referendums in the ratification of treaties, we are seeing the referendum 
emerge now as a default means of endorsing accession to membership itself. We have also 
seen the referendum emerge in two new contexts—dissent and exit—each of which suggest 





The use of the referendum across these various sites of constitution-making highlights the 
extent to which a referendum is a very different voting event from an election, and why the 
referendum has come to be seen both as highly significant and potentially problematic, 
particularly in territories beset by conflict or inter-ethnic division. This chapter discusses 
three main issues that highlight the difficulties that referendums present for democracy and 
the rule of law: (a) constitutional status; (b) sovereignty; and (c) how we conceive of the 
‘constitutional people’ or demos.
Constitutional versus constitutive referendums
Referendums must always be understood in relation to constitutional authority, that is, 
referendums do not occur in a vacuum. In a sense, there is no such thing as pure, 
unmediated direct democracy, and referendums are always relational: to an existing or 
emerging constitutional order, and to the elite actors who are institutionalized by an existing 
constitution or who act in a directional capacity in the creation of a new constitution. But it 
is still the case that the subject matter of referendums can vary greatly. In particular, it is 
useful to draw a distinction between the general and somewhat loose term ‘constitutional 
referendum’ and the more specific term, ‘constitutive referendum’, which is itself a category 
of constitutional referendum.
The term ‘constitutional referendum’ is a broad category, which we can take to mean any 
direct citizen-vote on a matter of constitutional change or constitutional creation. The 
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has defined constitutional referendums as 
‘popular votes in which the question of partially or totally revising a State’s Constitution . . . 
is asked’ (European Commission for Democracy Through Law 2001). As such, it can be a 
fairly routine exercise, for example part of the regular constitutional amendment process (as 
in Australia or Ireland), or it can be a ‘constitutive referendum’ when constitutional creation 
is at stake.
We can call the former ‘contained  constitutional referendums’, operating as part of the 
ordinary constitutional amendment process, either on their own or in a process of joint 
decision with parliament to change the constitution. This type of constitutional referendum 
takes place within, and its process and effects are determined by, existing constitutional 
structures. In this sense, the contained constitutional referendum is entirely internal to, and 
contained by, the constitution.
‘Constitutive  referendums’  are categorically different from contained constitutional 
referendums. They are instances of direct democracy deployed to create either new states or 
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new constitutions (or both). What makes these so challenging for constitutional theory and 
practice is that both the source of authority for such constitutions, and the legal effects they 
have, can be far less clear than is the case with contained constitutional referendums. 
Occurring as they do at the interface of an old and a new constitutional order, it is possible 
(or even unavoidable) that referendums be conceived as in some sense transcending the 
normative authority of the existing order, supplanting and replacing it with a new 
constitutional order.
This is all very familiar—constitutions emerge and need a new source of authority. The 
‘bootstrapping  issue’ (from  where does a new constitution derive its authority) is always 
there, whether a referendum is used or not. But it is also clear that the referendum takes on a 
totemic significance that sets it apart from other routes towards a new constitutional order. 
Perhaps the key to understanding the attractiveness of the referendum in constitution- 
making processes is that the referendum offers a unique source of legitimacy, which can act 
as a bridge from the old to the new order.
The authority of democratic constitutions hinges upon legitimacy. In modern democratic 
theory this has been symbolized by the idea of ‘the people’. But it is also accepted, going back 
to the Federalist Papers debates surrounding the Philadelphia process in the founding of the 
United States Constitution, that this idea of popular authorship of a constitution is highly 
attenuated. ‘The people’ do not really emerge directly as constitution-making actors. Insofar 
as they do, they are represented by elites.
This is where the constitutive referendum takes on particular salience. It can be presented 
as the transformation of the foundational popular act from one of symbolism to 
constitutional reality. Is it, in fact, the case that the referendum is a way in which the 
symbolism of popular constitutional authorship can be replaced by its actuality? This is 
certainly the sense of many embracing the referendum in these foundational moments. In 
this way, the referendum can play a key role not only in the process by which the new order 
derives its foundational authority but also in vesting it with the direct popular legitimacy that 
has come to be seen as the badge of validity for modern democratic constitutionalism.
It is in this context that the constitutive referendum takes on great significance. It is, 
therefore, perhaps no surprise that, in a number of the countries—Iraq and Egypt, for 
example—discussed during the fourth Edinburgh Dialogue on post-conflict constitution- 
building (see Underwood, Bisarya and Zulueta-Fülscher 2018), there is so much focus on the 
referendum as the defining event in the emergence of the new constitution. In attempts to 
bring legitimacy to the process, the direct political act of ‘the people’ was seen as a validating 
step like no other.
Sovereignty and the constitutive referendum
This conception of the popular role in the legitimization of a new constitution also informs 
how we might think about sovereignty. In the modern era there has been a tendency for 
sovereignty to be viewed as simply a matter of command: sovereignty is ultimate power, the 
power to order or control, and the issue for constitutionalists is simply to find its locus: 
where is sovereignty located institutionally within a constitutional order? And who within a 
constitutional system has the last word?
In fact, when we consider the key role played by popular legitimization in giving a 
constitution its foundational authority—or sovereignty—this account is insufficient. Just as 
constitutions derive their legal authority from the initial political legitimization given by ‘the 
people’, we must also understand foundational sovereignty and the authorization it gives to 
lived constitutional practice in relation to popular will.
In other words, the concept of sovereignty becomes a more complex concept when we tie 
it, as we must, to legitimacy. When we see popular endorsement emerge as the source of the 
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constitution’s  legitimacy, it is clear that sovereignty is tied inextricably to popular consent. 
And so, when people vote in a referendum on the founding of a new constitution, these 
people are in a sense the ‘constituent  subjects’ of the constitution. They help to form not 
only the governmental structure of a community but also its juridical and political identity 
(Tierney 2009). The link between the people and constitutional sovereignty is both 
foundational and ongoing—sustaining the everyday authority of the constitution. Again, this 
is another reason why a referendum can be so important when a constitution is being made. 
The popular role gives it foundational legitimacy, but it also helps this to be a lasting 
legitimacy: the people within the constitutional order can always refer back to the 
referendum as an act by their forebears, and in this sense their allegiance to the constitution 
may well be bolstered. We see this, for example, in relation to the Northern Ireland 
referendum in 1998. Both sides agreed to participate in this. Exit polls show that a majority 
of each community voted in favour. This has helped to support the agreement at times when 
the institutions themselves have failed.
In this way, we need to conceive of the constitutive referendum in terms of the vital role of 
the people in ‘constituting’ a polity and hence as being themselves the source of sovereignty 
within the constitutional order, not only in its political dimension but also in its role as 
source of legal authority.
Referendums and the ‘constitutional people’
This leads to a third issue: the relationship between the constitutive referendum and the way 
in which we define ‘the people’.  Just as the birth of a constitution leaves constitutionalists 
somewhat perplexed at how a new constitutional order can supplant an old, so too is there a 
debate about how the constitution changes the status of its authors, transforming them from 
constituents or subjects into citizens. The notion of citizen makes no sense until there is a 
constitution: it is the constitution that defines what it means to be a citizen, but at the same 
time the original people are the founding source of legitimacy of the constitution. We are left 
with a conundrum: do people make the constitution or does the constitution make the 
people?
A constitutive referendum can help to overcome this problem, replacing an abstract 
problem with a real solution. The issue in play here is that of identity, and how a constitutive 
referendum can play a role in helping to frame the civic identity of the polity.
It is often discussed how a constitution can have nation- or polity-shaping potential, 
giving articulation to the revised civic identity of the people under the new constitution and 
helping to develop that identity through patterns of affiliation with or loyalty to the 
constitution. But, if this is indeed the case, then the foundational moment can be crucial. 
One of the things that brings people together in a sense of shared citizenship of a polity is a 
reference point back to the framers of a constitution, and so on. But this association can be 
highly abstract. It is also an association that calls on the people to feel represented by what 
may have been a small founding elite. The constitutive referendum can act as a referent that 
is neither elite nor representative. The people today can relate back to the founding moment 
and see themselves—or at least a previous generation of themselves—in that moment, as 
direct constitutional authors. This would seem to have the potential to be a much more 
compelling formative story, capable of building popular identity with, and loyalty to, the 
polity in a unique way.
In short, the constitution is demos-shaping, but how much more salient is this process 
when the direct act of the people is the key instrumental move in forming that polity? 
Constitutive referendums must therefore also be understood for the polity-building or 
nation-building potential that they have. When referendums are used to make or re-create 
constitutions, they can themselves take on a vital nation-building role. In some sense, 
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through the direct engagement of the people in constituting the polity, referendums 
themselves become a key device in shaping the very identity of that polity and the political 
identities of the citizens. Again, when we look at the experience of referendums in Egypt and 
Iraq, when an attempt to build deep popular affiliation with the constitution was very much 
present, it is perhaps no surprise that the referendum was turned to. This is also the story of 
states, such as Croatia, Eritrea, Montenegro, Slovenia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and 
Ukraine, emerging from multinational polities, seeking to assert their own demotic 
distinctiveness.
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4. Problems with constitutive 
referendums in divided societies
The significance of referendums also leads us to the potential risks associated with them. The 
remainder of this paper will focus on two of these risks: defining ‘the  people’,  and the 
amenability of the constitutive referendum to accommodating societal pluralism.
If ‘the people’  is a key element in the formation of the constitution, there are extensive 
debates about how to constitute the people who will make this decision. By using a 
referendum to create the constitution and hence to create a constitutional people, this is 
already a ‘demos-forming’ move—it is declaring, in a sense, who the people are before the 
constitution is made.
This happens because any referendum brings with it two types of boundary creation. One 
is territorial: stakeholders are deciding on the space where the referendum should be held. 
This can involve deep disagreement over the physical boundaries of the polity, as we saw in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. It can also lead to questions about the involvement of 
related territories or states. In Northern Ireland in 1998, there was the implicit question as to 
whether ‘the people’ in Northern Ireland could alone decide the territory’s future. In the end, 
there were two referendums—one in Northern Ireland, the other in the Republic of Ireland, 
the latter concerning the Republic’s constitutional claims to the territory.
Second, what might be called a ‘franchise boundary’ is created. In holding a referendum, it 
is necessary to decide who can vote, what majority is required and if the decision is binding 
and upon whom. To take just one of these issues, who is entitled to vote can raise a particular 
set of problems of its own. Two questions surrounding the eligibility of voters have created 
controversy: are there, or should there be, people among those resident within the territory 
not entitled to vote? We saw these issues emerge in the post-Soviet period in the Baltic states 
where there were attempts to remove the franchise from ‘Russian’ residents. Another issue is 
the use of thresholds. The referendum on statehood in Montenegro in 2006 promised to be 
deeply contentious, given how small the population was, and the likelihood of a very close 
result. A threshold of 55 per cent was set, and, although it was only narrowly achieved, the 
result was sufficient to constitute a clear majority in the eyes of most observers.
It can also be a major issue in the decolonization process; for example, in New Caledonia, 
where plans remain in place to hold a referendum, but where there is discussion about how 
long an individual ought to have been resident to be entitled to the franchise, in order that 
indigenous residents are not overwhelmed by the voting power of more recent incomers. 
Another question is whether there are people resident beyond the territory to whom, 
nonetheless, the extension of the franchise is warranted? This emerged as an issue in the 
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Montenegro referendum of 2006, in relation to the many people who had left the republic 
since the 1990s.
In these questions, we see how the very definition of the demos can become deeply 
ideological, involving not only territorial space but also constructed identity-markers, such as 
legally defined residence, citizenship, nationality and ethnicity. The way in which the 
franchise issue is dealt with in the design of a referendum reveals much about the type of 
nationalist ideology that prevails within a particular state or territory; for example, particular 
rules of inclusion or exclusion reveal whether the vision of the nation that prevails is more or 
less ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ in orientation.
These issues also arise, of course, in elections surrounding a new constitution, but they can 
be more pronounced in a referendum that purports to be an act of direct constitutional 
authorship by a nascent people.
This leads to a second problem—pluralism. Given that the constitutive referendum has 
the potential salience it does, in terms of legitimizing constitutional authority, conditioning 
constitutional sovereignty and potentially shaping the very identity of the constitutional 
people, we should, of course, also be aware of the potential problems that can attend it when 
the very issue of peoplehood is deeply contested.
Since the constitutive referendum becomes a vehicle through which ‘the people’ can speak 
and determine their constitutional future, how can these processes accommodate deep and 
fraught issues of pluralism? In many of the situations addressed in the December workshop, 
the very notion of who constitutes ‘the people’  is deeply contested. One danger is that the 
referendum can essentialize the demos, positing the existence of ‘the people’ when that very 
term is in fact the deep source of the conflict. This was a pronounced problem, for example, 
in the referendum in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and was clearly a major factor in the 
Iraq referendum.
Can, therefore, the constitutive referendum be adapted to deep multinational pluralism? 
Is, what we might call, a ‘consociational  referendum’  feasible? To this end, it is possible in 
fact to require more than one majority in a referendum in order to determine and validate 
the outcome. Voters would vote as a particular group and the outcome of the referendum 
would require there to be a majority from each group, or some super-majority of groups, to 
pass. In a sense, and unofficially, the Belfast Agreement in 1998 is seen as a success in no 
small part due to winning majority support in both communities; the Bosnian referendum 
was a disaster because the Bosnian Serbs chose to boycott the process. One question is 
whether this would have been a possible approach in Iraq, although the situation there was so 
fraught and complex, the organizational dimension would have been very difficult, and the 
prospects of arriving at pluralized assent by no means clear.
A significant question of course remains—namely, the nature and status of the ‘created 
demos’. In many ways, the referendum is difficult precisely because there is no agreement on 
‘peoplehood’, and the referendum can itself exacerbate these problems. The real work that 
must go on in parallel is that of constitutional design, which works towards polity-building 
that is in the end inclusive and pluralistic, creating institutional guarantees and protections 
that reflect the state’s social complexity. Only in this way will a referendum on a new state or 
new constitution come to be seen as legitimate across the polity in the long run.
Another possible solution is sequencing. It might be possible to use the referendum as an 
endorsement of an agreement which is not tied up with issues of demos-creation and 
sovereignty. If there is a peace deal and you get agreement across communities you can then 
have the referendum as a validatory exercise. Essentially, this is an elite-led approach. The 
elites of the rival communities, and other state or international actors, arrive at a deal, which 
they then sell to their respective constituents. Can we talk about the voters in such a 
referendum as ‘a public’,  setting to one side the thicker and more contested term ‘people’? 
The identity and constitutional future of the territory remains contested but people are 
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willing to vote for a more contingent settlement. The referendum on the Belfast Agreement 
is perhaps an example of this. Another is the South Africa referendum in 1992. This was a 
referendum among white voters only. It was deployed by F. W. de Klerk, essentially as a way 
of giving him a mandate to conclude negotiations towards the ending of apartheid. That 
aside, the failure of the referendum in Colombia shows how the people can play a rejectionist 
role in relation to a deal carefully crafted by elites.
In such difficult situations, it is clear that we ought not to be too ambitious for 
referendums and what they can achieve. In the end, it may just be that a polity is being 
created that will depend upon a deeply attenuated approach to peoplehood and one that, in 
fact, requires the whole issue to be held in abeyance. Even the minimal requirement of 
constituting a voting public may be a deeply troubled one, and one not amenable to a general 
plenary voting event. The experience of Iraq bears this out. In short, in some situations the 
referendum is more of a threat than an aid to constitution-making. It does seem, however, 
that the referendum has become almost an automatic step in the move towards statehood for 
any people, and as such, even when the circumstances are extremely challenging for an 




The referendum is proliferating and is being used for the highest-level constitutional 
decisions, often in very fraught environments. One issue that is crucial is process. There is a 
need for more focus upon how referendums are framed and upon international standards in 
relation to the decision to hold a referendum, the framing of the issue, the setting of the 
question, oversight roles, spending rules, information to voters etc. There is a renewed 
interest in the possibility of making referendums truly deliberative, engaging the public 
meaningfully in decision-making. This dimension is also crucial if referendums are truly to 
be exercises in ‘popular’ democracy.
But process itself will not surmount the considerable difficulties that attend referendums, 
particularly in troubled settings. What is first required in territories such as Bougainville, 
where a referendum on independence is planned, is a full articulation of what a referendum 
does and the crucial role it can play in legitimizing a constitution, underpinning its 
sovereignty and helping to frame constitutional identity. It is also crucial to understand that a 
referendum posits the idea of ‘the  people’  speaking and determining; if the idea of ‘the 
people’  is deeply contested, the referendum may in fact exacerbate existing tensions. In 
appreciating how high the stakes are when referendums are used, it may then be easier to 
make an informed decision as to whether it is, in fact, wise to use a referendum and, if so, 
how to ensure that it is conducted in an open, democratic and deliberative way, and that its 
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is 
an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a 
universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by 
supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions 
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What do we do?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building 
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